PLAYBOY: What did you do after the
war?
ALINSKY: I went back to community-organization
work, crisscrossing the country, working in slums in New York and Detroit
and Buffalo and in Mexican barrios in California and the Southwest. Reveille
for Radicals became the number one best seller, and that helped drum
up more support for our work, but then the Cold War began to freeze and
McCarthyism started sweeping the country, making any radical activity increasingly
difficult. In those days everybody who challenged the establishment was
branded a Communist, and the radical movement began to disintegrate under
the pressure.
PLAYBOY: What was your own relationship
with the Communist Party?
ALINSKY: I knew plenty of Communists
in those days, and I worked with them on a number of projects. Back in
the Thirties, the Communists did a hell of a lot of good work; they were
in the vanguard of the labor movement and they played an important role
in aiding blacks and Okies and Southern sharecroppers. Anybody who tells
you he was active in progressive causes in those days and never worked
with the Reds is a goddamn liar. Their platform stood for all the right
things, and unlike many liberals, they were willing to put their bodies
on the line. Without the Communists, for example, I doubt the C.I.O. could
have won all the battles it did. I was also sympathetic to Russia in those
days, not because I admired Stalin or the Soviet system but because it
seemed to be the only country willing to stand up to Hitler. I was in charge
of a big part of fund raising for the International Brigade and in that
capacity I worked in close alliance with the Communist Party.
When the Nazi-Soviet Pact came, though,
and I refused to toe the party line and urged support for England and for
American intervention in the war, the party turned on me tooth and nail.
Chicago Reds plastered the Back of the Yards with big posters featuring
a caricature of me with a snarling, slavering fanged mouth and wild eyes,
labeled, "This is the face of a warmonger." But there were too many Poles,
Czechs, Lithuanians and Latvians in the area for that tactic to go over
very well. Actually, the greatest weakness of the party was its slavish
parroting of the Moscow line. It could have been much more effective if
it had adopted a relatively independent stance, like the western European
parties do today. But all in all, and despite my own fights with them,
I think the Communists of the Thirties deserve a lot of credit for the
struggles they led or participated in. Today the party is just a shadow
of the past, but in the Depiession it was a positive force for social change.
A lot of its leaders and organizers were jerks, of course, but objectively
the party in those days was on the right side and did considerable good.
PLAYBOY: Did you consider becoming a
party member prior to the Nazi-Soviet Pact?
ALINSKY: Not at any time. I've
never joined any organization -- not even the ones I've organized myself.
I prize my own independence too much. And philosophically, I could never
accept any rigid dogma or ideology, whether it's Christianity or Marxism.
One of the most important things in life is what judge Learned Hand described
as "that ever-gnawing inner doubt as to whether you're right." If you don't
have that, if you think you've got an inside track to absolute truth,
you become doctrinaire, humorless and intellectually constipated. The greatest
crimes in history have been perpetrated by such religious and political
and racial fanatics, from the persecutions of the Inquisition on down to
Communist purges and Nazi genocide. The great atomic physicist Niels
Bohr summed it up pretty well when he said, "Every sentence I utter must
be understood not as an affirmation, but as a question." Nobody owns the
truth, and dogma, whatever form it takes, is the ultimate enemy of human
freedom.
Now, this doesn't mean that I'm
rudderless; I think I have a much keener sense of direction and purpose
than the true believer with his rigid ideology, because I'm free to be
loose, resilient and independent, able to respond to any situation as it
arises without getting trapped by articles of faith. My only fixed truth
is a belief in people, a conviction that if people have the opportunity
to act freely and the power to control their own destinies, they'll generally
reach the right decisions. The only alternative to that belief is rule
by an elite, whether it's a Communist bureaucracy or our own present-day
corporate establishment. You should never have an ideology more specific
than that of the founding fathers: "For the general welfare." That's where
I parted company with the Communists in the Thirties, and that's where
I stay parted from them today.
PLAYBOY: Did the McCarthy era affect
you personally?
ALINSKY: No, not directly, but
the general malaise made it much more difficult to organize for radical
goals. And in the long run, McCarthy really did a terrible injury to the
country. Before McCarthy, every generation had its radicals who were prepared
to stand up and fight the system. But then McCarthy transformed the country
into a graveyard of fear; liberals who had casually joined the party or
its front groups broke and ran for cover in an orgy of opportunism, many
of them betraying their friends and associates to save their own skins.
The fire-breathing radicals of the Thirties turned tail and skulked away,
leaving behind a pitiful legacy of cowardice. And there was no one left
except a few battered holdouts to hand the torch on to the next generation
of radicals. That's why so many kids today sneer at their parents as cop-out
artists, and they're right.
The saddest thing is that if liberals
and radicals had just held a united front against McCarthy, they could
have stopped him cold. I remember in the early Fifties his committee came
to see me; they told me that if I didn't supply them with lists of names
of people I'd known, they'd subpoena me and McCarthy would destroy my reputation.
I just laughed in their faces, and before I threw 'em out I said, "Reputation?
What reputation? You think I give a damn about my reputation? Call me as
a witness; you won't get any Fifth Amendment from me. He can force me to
answer yes and no, but once I get out into the corridor with the press,
then he can't stop me from talking about the way he courted Communist support
for his Senate fight against La Follette in '46. Tell McCarthy to go to
hell." They had come in all arrogant, expecting me to crawl and beg, but
when they left they were really whitefaced and shook up. I continued organizing
throughout the Fifties without any trouble from Washington, although I
caught a lot of flak from local police in the communities where I was working.
PLAYBOY: What was your major organizational
effort of this period?
ALINSKY: The Woodlawn district
of Chicago, which was a black ghetto every bit as bad as Back of the Yards
had been in the Thirties. In 1958, a group of black leaders came to me
and explained how desperate conditions were in Woodlawn and asked our help
in organizing the community. At first, I hesitated; we had our hands full
at the time, and besides, I'd never organized a black slum before and I
was afraid my white skin might prove an insurmountable handicap. Friends
of mine in the civil rights movement who knew I was considering the idea
told me to forget it; nobody could organize Woodlawn; the place made Harlem
look like Grosse Pointe; it was impossible. But there was only one way
to find out: Try it. So the decision was go.
At first, it did look as if my
whiteness might be a major obstacle, but then, as always, the good old
establishment came to my rescue. The University of Chicago, which controlled
huge hunks of real estate in the area, was trying to push through an urban-renewal
program that would have driven out thousands of Woodlawn residents and
made their property available for highly profitable real-estate development,
which naturally made the U. of C. a universally hated and feared institution
in Woodlawn. The saying in the ghetto then was "Urban renewal means Negro
removal."
Once I announced my intentions to organize
Woodlawn, the man in the street looked on me as just another white do-gooder.
All the university needed to do to knock me out of action effectively was
to issue a statement welcoming me to the neighborhood and hailing me as
an illustrious alumnus. Instead, their spokesmen blasted hell out of me
as a dangerous and irresponsible outside agitator, and all the Chicago
papers picked up the cue and denounced me as a kind of latter-day Attila
the Hun. Off the record, the university was charging that I was funded
by the Catholic Church and the Mafia! Crazy. Well, this was great; right
away, people in Woodlawn began to say, "Christ, this guy must not only
be OK, he must have something on them if he bugs those bastards so much,"
and they became receptive to our organizing pitch.
Anyway, we quickly gained the
support of all the Catholic and Protestant churches in the area and within
a few months we had the overwhelming majority of the community solidly
behind us and actively participating in our programs. Incidentally, my
leading organizer at the time was Nicholas von Hoffman, who has since become
a writer and is now with The Washington Post. Nick's contribution was crucial.
We picketed, protested, boycotted and applied political and economic pressure
against local slumlords and exploitive merchants, the University of Chicago
and the political machine of Mayor Daley -- and we won.
We stopped the urban-renewal program;
we launched a massive voter-registration drive for political power; we
forced the city to improve substandard housing and to build new low-cost
public housing; we won representation on decisionmaking bodies like the
school board and anti-poverty agencies; we got large-scale job-training
programs going; we brought about major improvements in sanitation, public
health and police procedures. The Woodlawn Organization became the first
community group not only to plan its own urban renewal but, even more important,
to control the letting of contracts to building contractors; this meant
that unless the contractors provided jobs for blacks, they wouldn't get
the contracts. It was touching to see how competing contractors suddenly
discovered the principles of brotherhood and racial equality.
Once TWO had proved itself as a potent
political and economic force, it was recognized even by Mayor Daley, although
he tried to undercut it by channeling hundreds of thousands of Federal
anti-poverty dollars to "safe" projects; Daley has always wanted -- and
gotten -- all Federal money disbursed through City Hall to his own housebroken
political hacks. But perhaps our most important accomplishment in Woodlawn
was intangible; by building a mass power organization, we gave the people
a sense of identity and pride. After living in squalor and despair for
generations, they suddenly discovered the unity and resolve to score victories
over their. enemies, to take their lives back into their own hands and
control their own destinies. We didn't solve all their problems overnight,
but we showed them that those problems could be solved through their own
dedication and their own indigenous black leadership. When we entered Woodlawn,
it was a decaying, hopeless ghetto; when we left, it was a fighting, united
community.
PLAYBOY: Were the tactics you employed
in Woodlawn different from those you would have used in a white slum?
ALINSKY: Race doesn't really
make that much difference. All tactics means is doing what you can with
what you have. Just like in Back of the Yards, we had no money at our disposal
in Woodlawn, but we had plenty of people ready and willing to put themselves
on the line, and their bodies became our greatest asset. At one point in
the Woodlawn fight, we were trying to get Chicago's big department stores
to give jobs to blacks. A few complied, but one of the largest stores in
the city -- and one of the largest in the country -- refused to alter its
hiring practices and wouldn't even meet with us. We thought of mass picketing,
but by now that had become a rather stale and familiar tactic, and we didn't
think it would have much of an impact on this particular store. Now, one
of my basic tactical principles is that the threat is often more effective
than the tactic itself, as long as the power structure knows you have the
power and the will to execute it; you can't get anywhere bluffing in this
game, but you can psych out your opponent with the right strategy.
Anyway, we devised our tactic for this
particular department store. Every Saturday, the busiest shopping day of
the week, we decided to charter buses and bring approximately 3,000 blacks
from Woodlawn to this downtown store, all dressed up in their Sunday best.
Now, you put 3,000 blacks on the floor of a store, even a store this big,
and the color of the entire store suddenly changes: Any white coming through
the revolving doors will suddenly think he's in Africa. So they'd lose
a lot of their white trade right then and there. But that was only the
beginning. For poor people, shopping is a time-consuming business, because
economy is paramount and they're constantly comparing and evaluating prices
and quality. This would mean that at every counter you'd have groups of
blacks closely scrutinizing the merchandise and asking the salesgirl interminable
questions. And needless to say, none of our people would buy a single item
of merchandise. You'd have a situation where one group would tie up the
shirt counter and move on to the underwear counter, while the group previously
occupying the underwear counter would take over the shirt department. And
everybody would be very pleasant and polite, of course; after all, who
was to say they weren't bona-fide potential customers? This procedure would
be followed until one hour before closing time, when our people would begin
buying everything in sight to be delivered C. O. D. This would tie up delivery
service for a minimum of two days, with additional heavy costs and administrative
problems, since all the merchandise would be refused upon delivery.
With the plan set, we leaked it to one
of the stool pigeons every radical organization needs as a conduit of carefully
selected information to the opposition, and the result was immediate. The
day after we paid the deposit for the chartered buses, the department-store
management called us and gave in to all our demands; overnight, they opened
up nearly 200 jobs for blacks on both the sales and executive levels, and
the remaining holdout stores quickly followed their lead. We'd won completely,
and through a tactic that, if implemented, would be perfectly legal and
irresistible. Thousands of people would have been "shopping" and the police
would have been powerless to interfere. What's more, the whole thing would
have been damned good fun, an exciting outing and a release from the drab
monotony of ghetto life. So this simple tactic encompassed all the elements
of good organization -- imagination, legality, excitement and, above all,
effectiveness.
PLAYBOY: And coercion.
ALINSKY: No, not coercion --
popular pressure in the democratic tradition. People don't get opportunity
or freedom or equality or dignity as an act of charity; they have to fight
for it, force it out of the establishment. This liberal cliche about reconciliation
of opposing forces is a load of crap. Reconciliation means just one thing:
When one side gets enough power, then the other side gets reconciled to
it. That's where you need organization -- first to compel concessions and
then to make sure the other side delivers. If you're too delicate to exert
the necessary pressures on the power structure, then you might as well
get out of the ball park. This was the fatal mistake the white liberals
made, relying on altruism as an instrument of social change. That's just
self-delusion. No issue can be negotiated unless you first have the clout
to compel negotiation.
PLAYBOY: This emphasis on conflict and
power led Philip M. Hauser, former chairman of the University of Chicago's
Department of Sociology, to say at the time of your Woodlawn struggle that
any black who follows you "may be the victim of a cruel, even if unintended,
hoax ... [because] the methods by which [Alinsky] organized TWO may actually
have impeded the achievement of consensus and thus delayed the attaining
of Woodlawn's objectives." How would you respond to him?
ALINSKY: I think the record of
Woodlawn's evolution refutes it more convincingly than I could with words.
In fact, I strongly doubt Hauser would say the same thing today; the university
is now proud of TWO and fully reconciled to its goals. But apart from the
specific criticism, this general fear of conflict and emphasis on consensus
and accommodation is typical academic drivel. How do you ever arrive at
consensus before you have conflict? In fact, of course, conflict is the
vital core of an open society; if you were going to express democracy in
a musical score, your major theme would be the harmony of dissonance. All
change means movement, movement means friction and friction means heat.
You'll find consensus only in a totalitarian state, Communist or fascist.
My opposition to consensus politics,
however, doesn't mean I'm opposed to compromise; just the opposite. In
the world as it is, no victory is ever absolute; but in the world as it
is, the right things also invariably get done for the wrong reasons. We
didn't win in Woodlawn because the establishment suddenly experienced a
moral revelation and threw open its arms to blacks; we won because we backed
them into a corner and kept them there until they decided it would be less
expensive and less dangerous to surrender to our demands than to continue
the fight. I remember that during the height of our Woodlawn effort, I
attended a luncheon with a number of presidents of major corporations who
wanted to "know their enemy." One of them said to me, "Saul, you seem like
a nice guy personally, but why do you see everything only in terms of power
and conflict rather than from the point of view of good will and reason
and cooperation?" I told him, "Look, when you and your corporation approach
competing corporations in terms of good will, reason and cooperation instead
of going for the jugular, then I'll follow your lead." There was a long
silence at the table, and the subject was dropped. |